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I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s public schools, students designated as “white” and 
“Asian” consistently outperform students from other ethnic groups in test 
scores and graduation rates.1 These disparities, commonly called “the 
achievement gap,” are a symptom of greater issues, or “opportunity 
gaps.”2 In fact, commissioned studies on the achievement gap in Wash-
ington public schools show that the gap is the result of, in part, policies 
that are neutral on their face but have a disproportionate effect on com-
munities and students of color.3 These gaps are evidenced in several are-
as, including performance on standardized tests, classroom assessments, 
tardiness and absences, access to key courses, advanced placement 
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 1. HB 2722 ADVISORY COMM. & OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, A PLAN 
TO CLOSE THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.k12.wa.us/cisl/pubdocs/AfrAmer%20AchGap%20Rpt%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter A 
PLAN TO CLOSE]. Current data shows that 23.6 percent of African-American students in Washington 
State drop out during their high school years. The Washington Assessment of Student Learning 
(WASL) for 4th, 7th, and 10th grades shows the glaring disparity, but the results are no different 
than disparate scores on standardized tests used over the last thirty years. Id. 
 2. Id. at 6. There are a number of different gaps that contribute to this phenomenon of low 
achievement: an opportunity gap, a resource gap, a readiness-to-learn gap, and a preparation gap of 
teachers constituting an overall education gap. Id. 
 3. Id. at 10. The study cites several systemic factors contributing to the disparities, including 
inequitable distribution of skilled, experienced teachers; insufficient and inequitable school funding; 
and inequitable access to pre-college coursework. 
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courses, and higher education; and attainments of high school diplomas 
and GEDs, college degrees, and academic honors.4  
These problems are not unique to Washington State—they have 
deep roots in our nation’s history.5 Efforts to address the achievement 
gap and inequities increased with Brown v. Board of Education6 and the 
passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965 (the 
current reauthorization of this Act is the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001), which was a far-reaching attempt to obtain equal access to educa-
tion and educational resources.7 But gaps persist. 
Washington has recently taken a further step to address the 
achievement gap and racial discrimination in schools. In 2010, the Wash-
ington legislature passed the Equal Education Opportunity Law (EEOL), 
HB 3026, in response to the recommendations in commissioned 
achievement gap studies.8 Now codified as Washington’s Revised Code 
28A.642, the EEOL states the following: 
Discrimination in Washington public schools on the basis of 
race, creed, religion, color, national origin, honorably discharged 
veteran or military status, sexual orientation including gender 
expression or identity, the presence of any sensory, mental, or 
physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service 
animal by a person with a disability is prohibited.9 
The EEOL is an expansion of Washington’s existing public school anti-
discrimination law, which had only prohibited discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex,10 and was intended to model the sex equality law.11 The EEOL 
                                                 
 4. Id; see also Tamar Lewin, Black Students Face More Discipline, Data Suggests, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/education/black-students-face-more-harsh-
discipline-data-shows.html?_r=0. 
 5. A PLAN TO CLOSE, supra note 1, at 1. Our society bears the legacy of a long history of rac-
ism, exclusion, and low expectations for minority children. 
 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2011). 
 8. WASH. STATE H.R. EDUC. COMM., HB 3026 BILL ANALYSIS 1–2 (2010), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/3026%20HBA%20E 
D%2010.pdf [hereinafter HB 3026 EDUCATION COMMITTEE BILL ANALYSIS]. Draft recommenda-
tions from the Committee to the legislature recommended that OSPI be given legal authority to take 
affirmative steps to ensure that school districts comply with state and federal civil rights laws. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.640 (2010) (the sex equity law) should be updated to include other federal 
and state protected classes. 
 9. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.010 (2010). 
 10. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.640 (1975). 
 11. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.640.005 (2010) (“The legislature directed the OSPI to ensure that 
school districts comply with all civil rights laws, similar to what has already been authorized in 
chapter 28A.640 RCW with respect to discrimination on the basis of sex.”); see also HB 3026 
EDUCATION COMMITTEE BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 8 (stating that new chapter is modeled after the 
sexual equality chapter already in the school code). 
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also authorizes the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
(OSPI) to enforce this law through regulations.12 
This Comment argues that the OSPI’s promulgated regula-
tions to enforce the EEOL cannot effectively carry out the intent of 
the EEOL because they do not expressly prohibit disparate impact 
discrimination. Because legislators intended the EEOL to close the 
achievement gap, which results from race-neutral policies, an ex-
plicit prohibition of disparate impact discrimination is necessary to 
seriously address these deeply rooted problems. 
Part II of this Comment explains the theory of disparate impact dis-
crimination and its influence on the achievement gap.13 Part III examines 
the scope and purpose of the EEOL and the OSPI regulations in the 
Washington Administrative Code.14 Part IV argues that the OSPI regula-
tions are insufficient to improve the achievement gap because if the law 
does not explicitly prohibit disparate impact discrimination, then ag-
grieved persons may be barred from relief because alternate claims—
such as disparate treatment and equal protection—are much more diffi-
cult to prove.15 Also, a lack of clarity in the OSPI regulations may result 
in a limitation on aggrieved persons’ right to a private right of action.16 
Part V argues that OSPI should amend the regulations to clearly prohibit 
policies and procedures that result in discrimination in order to adequate-
ly reach achievement gap claims.17 
II. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 
The achievement gap is not a reflection on students’ ability to learn, 
but rather on the inadequacies of our education system. We have come a 
long way since Brown v. Board of Education,18 but the legacy of racism 
in our schools still needs addressing. Section A introduces the laws put in 
place to stop racial discrimination in schools and explains how Washing-
ton’s achievement gap problem should be addressed under the doctrine 
of disparate impact discrimination. Section B then explains how the 
achievement gap evidences proof of discrimination in the school setting. 
                                                 
 12. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.020 (2010) (“The superintendent of public instruction shall 
develop rules and guidelines to eliminate discrimination prohibited in RCW 28A.642.010 as it ap-
plies to public school employment, counseling and guidance services to students, recreational and 
athletic activities for students, access to course offerings, and in textbooks and instructional materi-
als used by students.”). 
 13. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV.A. 
 16. See infra Part IV.B. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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A. Early Federal and Washington State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination 
in Schools 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[n]o person 
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”19 The purpose of Title VI is to ensure that public 
funds are not spent in a way that encourages, subsidizes, or results in ra-
cial discrimination.20 To that end, Title VI authorizes and directs federal 
agencies to enact rules and regulations that are consistent with achieve-
ment of the statute’s objectives.21 Most federal agencies adopt regula-
tions that prohibit the recipients of federal funds from using criteria or 
methods in the administration of their programs that have the effect of 
subjecting individuals to discrimination based on race, color, or national 
origin.22 Public school systems are included in Title VI’s definition of 
“program or activity.”23 
While Title VI does not expressly state what discrimination consists 
of, courts have held that Title VI claims may be proven under two theo-
ries: intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) and disparate impact 
(disparate effects). Under the theory of intentional discrimination, the 
recipient, in violation of the statute, engages in intentional discrimination 
based on race, color, or national origin.24 Under the theory of disparate 
impact, no proof of intent is required if a recipient, in violation of agency 
regulations, uses a neutral procedure or practice that has a disproportion-
ate adverse effect on a group protected by Title VI.25 
In Title VI cases, courts have followed Title VII’s standard of proof 
for disparate impact.26 The Supreme Court first adopted the disparate 
impact theory in the context of employment and Title VII in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co.27 At issue in Griggs was an employer’s requirement that 
employees seeking jobs or promotions have a high school diploma and 
                                                 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). 
 20. See Guardians Ass’n. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 609 (1983). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1 (1964). 
 22. Title VI Legal Manual, VIII. What Constitutes Discriminatory Conduct?, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Sept. 1998), http://www.justice.gov/crt/grants_statutes /legalman.php#VIII [hereinafter 
Title VI Legal Manual]. 
 23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d–4a(2)(B) (1964) (“For the purposes of this subchapter, the term “pro-
gram or activity” and the term “program” mean all of the operations of . . . a local educational agen-
cy (as defined in section 7801 of Title 20), system of vocational education, or other school system.”). 
 24. Title VI Legal Manual, supra note 22. 
 25. Elston v. Talladega Cnty. Bd of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 26. Id. (“In deciding Title VI disparate impact claims we borrow from standards formulated in 
Title VII disparate impact cases.”). 
 27. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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pass an intelligence test. While these requirements were applied equally 
to Caucasian and African-American persons seeking jobs and promo-
tions, the requirement resulted in an adverse impact for African-
American applicants, who had long received inferior education in segre-
gated schools.28 The Court found that the employer’s requirements inval-
idated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and held that the Act prohibited “not 
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation.”29 Even where the practice is neutral in terms 
of intent, it is prohibited unless justified by a business necessity related 
to job performance.30 
After establishing the disparate impact theory in Griggs, Congress 
codified the theory in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, and 
national origin.31 To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact dis-
crimination under Title VII, “a plaintiff must show that the facially neu-
tral employment practice had a significantly discriminatory impact. If 
that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate that ‘any giv-
en requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion,’ in order to avoid a finding of discrimination.”32 In the education 
context, the defendant must show that the policy or procedure in question 
has a manifest relationship to the education in question.33 
Before the passage of the EEOL, the Washington state civil rights 
law that prohibited discrimination in public schools was the Washington 
Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).34 WLAD generally recognizes 
                                                 
 28. Id. at 429. 
 29. Id. at 431. 
 30. Id. “[B]ut good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment 
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are 
unrelated to measuring job capability.” Id. at 432. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 pro-
vides, 
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under 
this subchapter only if – 
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment 
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or nation-
al origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with 
respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such al-
ternative employment practice. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
 32. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446–47 (1982) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 432 (1971)); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, 
708 F.2d 475, 481 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 33. Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 983 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 34. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2009). 
1924 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1919 
“the right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, 
national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sex-
ual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disa-
bility or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal.”35 Educational 
institutions are recognized within the statute and regulations as a place of 
public accommodation, and thus, are prohibited from discriminating on 
the basis of any of the protected classes.36 
Individuals claiming discrimination under the WLAD can file a 
complaint with the Washington State Human Rights Commission (HRC), 
created by the WLAD.37 The HRC acts as a neutral fact finder and inves-
tigates complaints. Upon a finding of reasonable cause to believe that an 
unfair practice has been or is being committed, the HRC must endeavor 
to eliminate the unfair practice.38 Alternatively, in lieu of the HRC com-
plaint process, a complainant can file a civil suit against the alleged 
wrongdoer.39 While the WLAD provided an avenue for complaints of 
discrimination, prior to the enactment of the EEOL, there was no state 
agency with authority— short of a specific claim of direct discrimina-
tion—to monitor or enforce the law. 
In Washington, no case law yet exists where a student has brought a 
disparate impact discrimination claim against a school or school district. 
However, similar to the federal laws, employment and labor discrimina-
tion analysis lends itself to analysis for discrimination in public accom-
modation settings, such as educational institutions. Furthermore, Wash-
ington’s employment and labor cases confirm that the WLAD prohibits 
not only disparate treatment discrimination but also disparate impact dis-
crimination. For example, in Oliver v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone 
Co., the Washington State Supreme Court held that claims under state 
statutes prohibiting employment discrimination, such as the WLAD, may 
be brought under either disparate impact or disparate treatment.40 As un-
der Title VII, to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrim-
ination under the WLAD, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a facially neu-
                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040 (2009). 
 37. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.050 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.230 (2008); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 49.60.240 (2010). The HRC is charged with investigating complaints, issuing written 
findings of fact, and determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair practice 
has been committed. Upon a finding of reasonable cause, the HRC must try to eliminate the unfair 
practice. If no agreement is reached and the unfair practice is not eliminated, an administrative law 
judge can hear the complaint and is empowered to award damages, an injunction, and affirmative 
action so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. 
 38. The Complaint Process, HUM. RTS. COMMISSION, http://www.hum.wa.gov/Complaint 
Process/Index.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
 39. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.340 (1993). 
 40. Oliver v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 724 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Wash. 1986). 
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tral41 employment practice (2) falls more harshly on a protected class.42 
Proof of an employer’s intent to discriminate by adopting a particular 
policy or practice is not required.43 If the plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to establish that the 
practice complained of has a “manifest relationship” to the employment 
in question or is justified by a business necessity.44 Thus, under Oliver, 
an aggrieved person could bring a WLAD claim under the theory of dis-
parate impact discrimination without a required showing of proof of in-
tent. 
B. The Achievement Gap as Proof of Discrimination 
The problem of disparate impact discrimination in the education 
system is often evidenced by severe disparities between various demo-
graphic groups of students. Achievement gaps are most significantly 
based upon race and ethnicity, but other factors such as income levels, 
language background, disability status, and gender also play a role.45 In 
fact, these categories are often intertwined.46 Wanda Brown, a repre-
sentative for the African-American community in the achievement gap 
studies, described the disparities as follows: 
The term ‘achievement gap’ puts the blame on students of color—
that they are to blame for not achieving at the same rates as their 
white peers. The achievement gap is evidence of the inadequacies of 
our education system, not our students’ ability to learn. All students 
can learn—the question is whether we give all students equitable 
opportunities or access to the tools they need to learn. In this con-
                                                 
 41. The court noted that the term “neutral” refers to an employment practice that contains no 
reference to race or other protected classes. This includes such practices as employment tests; educa-
tional requirements; professional and academic employment tests; arrest and conviction records; 
credit, garnishment, and bankruptcy records; drug history; length of experience requirements; specif-
ic work history requirements; and height and weight standards. Oliver, 724 P.2d at 1006 n.1. 
 42. Id. at 1006. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, CLOSING ACHIEVEMENT GAPS: AN ASSOCIATION GUIDE 2 (2006), 
available at http://www.friendsofpubliced.org/assets/Files/closinggaps.pdf [hereinafter CLOSING 
ACHIEVEMENT GAPS]. 
 46. See, e.g., Malik Edwards, Footnote Eleven for the New Millennium: Ecological Perspective 
Arguments in Support of Compelling Interest, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 891, 892 (2008) (“While our 
cities may not be burning today, the maintenance of a system of ghetto schools provides the tinder 
from which they may ignite again. Educational reformers face a daunting task in their efforts to 
address the impact of the educational achievement gap. Reformers cannot address only a single issue 
and hope to adequately understand or ameliorate educational failure: the problem has too many 
facets. America’s schools continue to be racially, ethnically, and economically segregated, and class-
rooms that had been integrated are re-segregating at a rapid pace.”). 
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text, the most appropriate term is ‘opportunity gap’ or ‘access 
gap.’47 
The achievement gap is, in part, the result of policies and practices that 
are neutral—nondiscriminatory—on their face but have a disproportion-
ately deleterious impact on students and communities of color.48 
In 2008, recognizing the presence of achievement gaps in schools 
throughout the state, the Washington State Legislature commissioned 
studies to analyze the differences in academic achievement and educa-
tion outcomes among various subgroups of students—specifically Afri-
can-American, Latino, Native-American, Asian-American, and Pacific 
Islander students.49 These commissioned studies showed that white and 
Asian students in Washington consistently outperform students in other 
ethnic groups.50 More specifically, the studies showed that African-
American, Hispanic, Pacific Islander, and Native-American students 
scored consistently lower on Washington Assessment of Student Learn-
ing (WASL) exams—at both the fourth grade and tenth grade levels—
than their white and Asian peers.51 Moreover, the studies showed that 
African-American students are more than two times as likely to drop out 
of school compared to white and Asian students.52 The committee also 
                                                 
 47. ACHIEVEMENT GAP OVERSIGHT & ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., CLOSING OPPORTUNITY 
GAPS IN WASHINGTON’S PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM 3 (2010), available at http://www.capaa.wa. 
gov/documents/AgapLegReportFinal.pdf. 
 48. Letter from Linda Mangel, Dir. of Educ. Equity Program, ACLU of Wash., to Yvonne 
Ryans, Dir. of Equity & Civil Rights, Office of Superintendent of Pub. Instruction (Jan. 26, 2011), 
available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/aclu-wa-opposes-inadequate-rules-protecting-students-against-
discrimination. When these issues are litigated, courts apply a disparate impact analysis. 
 49. H.B. 2722, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). In 2008, the Washington State Legislature 
passed HB 2722, which expressed the legislature’s intention to “commission and then implement a 
clear, concise, and intentional plan of action, with specific strategies and performance benchmarks, 
to ensure that African American students meet or exceed all academic standards and are prepared for 
a quality life and responsible citizenship in the twenty-first century.” Id. at 2. The four other reports 
were commissioned and submitted to the legislature. 
 50. A PLAN TO CLOSE, supra note 1, at 11. 
African-American students are under-represented in advanced placement and gifted programs, 
but over-represented in special education and discipline referrals. They are less likely to be en-
rolled in rigorous coursework, including the key disciplines of science and math, and more 
likely to drop out of high school. They are less likely to attend and graduate from college.  
Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 22. The estimated on-time graduation rate for African-American students is 53.6 
percent, nearly 23 percent below the highest performing demographic group. The estimated on-time 
graduation rate for Hispanic students is 57.5 percent, 19 percent below the highest performing de-
mographic group. The estimated on-time graduation rate for white and Asian/Pacific Islander stu-
dents is 74.1 percent and 76.5 percent, respectively. 
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recognized that Washington ranks second to last in the nation for a teach-
ing force that is representative of the state’s ethnic composition.53 
While it is possible that some of the disparities resulted from inten-
tional racism, the African-American Achievement Gap Report cites to 
numerous sources that were likely put in place as neutral policies—
without discriminatory intent—but resulted in a disproportionally delete-
rious impact on students and communities of color. The report specifical-
ly cites the following sources of discrimination that cause the gap: ineq-
uitable distribution of skilled, experienced teachers; insufficient and in-
equitable school funding; inadequate, obsolete, and unbalanced distribu-
tion of facilities, technology, and instructional materials; inequitable ac-
cess to demanding, rigorous pre-college coursework; institutional racism; 
lack of cultural competence among teachers, school staff, administrators, 
curriculum and assessment developers, and the school system itself.54 
Similarly, the Education Trust cites one clear source of discrimination: 
“Many minority students attend inner-city schools, which are often un-
derfunded. As a result, those students tend to receive poorer-quality in-
struction, have fewer high-caliber teachers, and have access to fewer re-
sources.”55 
In an effort to close the gaps, the legislature formed a committee to 
synthesize the findings and recommendations into an implementation 
plan and to recommend policies and strategies to the superintendent of 
public instruction, the professional educator board, and the state board of 
education.56 Among the several recommendations the committee brought 
to the legislature in 2009 were that the legislature broaden the protected 
                                                 
 53. EDUCATION NEXT (Winter 2009), reprinted in ACHIEVEMENT GAP OVERSIGHT & 
ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., CLOSING OPPORTUNITY GAPS IN WASHINGTON’S PUBLIC EDUCATION 
SYSTEM 7 (2011), available at http://www.k12.wa.us/AchievementGap/pubdocs/AgapLegReport 
2011.pdf. Over 90 percent of the state’s teachers are white, while only less than 70 percent of stu-
dents are white. Id. 
 54. A PLAN TO CLOSE, supra note 1, at 10. “More than an issue of poverty, the achievement 
gap is also about race. WASL data reveals that White and Asian students in poverty score higher 
than African American students not in poverty.” Id. at 11. 
 55. THE EDUCATION TRUST (2002), reprinted in CLOSING OPPORTUNITY GAPS IN 
WASHINGTON’S PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM, supra note 53, at 8. 
 56. S.B. 5973, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009). Specifically, the Committee was charged 
with recommending policies and strategies in the following areas: supporting and facilitating parent 
and community involvement and outreach; enhancing the cultural competency of current and future 
educators and the cultural relevance of curriculum and instruction; expanding pathways and strate-
gies to prepare and recruit diverse teachers and administrators; recommending current programs and 
resources that should be redirected to narrow the gap; identifying data elements and systems needed 
to monitor progress in closing the gap; making closing the achievement gap part of the school and 
school district improvement process; and exploring innovative school models that have shown suc-
cess in closing the achievement gap. 
1928 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1919 
classes and give OSPI the legal authority to ensure that school districts 
comply with state and federal civil rights laws.57 
III. THE EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY LAW 
In response to the Committee’s recommendations, in 2010 the 
Washington State Legislature passed House Bill 3026, the Equal Educa-
tion Opportunity Law, in order to specifically prohibit discrimination in 
public schools on the basis of “race, creed, religion, color, national 
origin, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation 
including gender expression or identity, the presence of any sensory, 
mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service 
animal by a person with a disability.”58 
Prior to the enactment of the EEOL, the OSPI did not have the au-
thority to monitor or enforce civil rights laws in Washington public 
schools.59 The legislature recognized that while numerous existing state 
and federal laws prohibit discrimination on these grounds, as well as on 
basis of sex, the common school provisions of Title 28A of Washing-
ton’s Revised Code did not include specific acknowledgement of the 
right to be free from discrimination of this sort.60 By specifically prohib-
iting discrimination on these bases, the legislature gave authority to its 
own agency, OSPI, to enforce this law. With its statutory authorization, 
OSPI developed rules and guidelines to eliminate the prohibited discrim-
ination “as it applies to public school employment, counseling and guid-
ance services to students, recreational and athletic activities for students, 
access to course offerings, and in textbooks and instructional materials 
used by students.” 61 
                                                 
 57. Memorandum from the Achievement Gap Oversight & Accountability Comm. to Wash. 
State Legislature (Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://www.k12.wa.us/cisl/pubdocs/ 
MemotoLeg1.10.pdf. Other recommendations are available at http://www.k12.wa.us/cisl/pubdocs/ 
Synthesis2008Recommendations.pdf. 
 58. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.010 (2010). 
 59. The OSPI oversaw other aspects of K–12 public education in Washington, including work-
ing with school districts to administer basic education programs, supervising school district budget-
ing and accounting, collecting data on student demographics and performance, and administering 
student testing. 
 60. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.005 (2010). State anti-discrimination laws are important in 
addition to federal laws as most state laws provide relief that the federal laws do not. “It is important 
to determine whether the relevant state law reaches discrimination or harassment in education, 
whether it provides for administrative enforcement, whether it provides for a private right of action, 
and the type of relief available.” Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment-Interference with an Equal 
Educational Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79 NEB. L. REV. 1, 45 (2000) (em-
phasis added). 
 61. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.020 (2010). 
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According to its stated purpose, the EEOL was enacted to address 
the “deleterious effect of discrimination.”62 Moreover, the legislature 
names the recommendations of the Achievement Gap Oversight and Ac-
countability Committee as a motivation for enacting the law.63 Further, 
the EEOL is an expansion of Washington’s existing public school anti-
discrimination law, which only prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
sex,64 and was intended to model the sex equality law.65 
While the EEOL does not expressly define “discrimination,” it has 
been argued that the use of the general term “discrimination” was intend-
ed to include both direct discrimination and disparate impact discrimina-
tion—discrimination that results from policies or practices that are neu-
tral on their face but have a discriminatory effect or impact.66 Moreover, 
the EEOL was enacted to address the “deleterious effect of discrimina-
tion,” which is a common description of disparate impact discrimina-
tion.67 Further, given the purpose of the EEOL to eliminate the achieve-
ment gap—which is partly caused by neutral policies that have a dispar-
ate, deleterious effect on communities of color—the EEOL should be 
construed to include disparate impact discrimination. 
OSPI’s regulations are codified in chapter 392–190 of Washing-
ton’s Administrative Code, “Equal Education Opportunity—Unlawful 
Discrimination Prohibited.”68 The purpose statement establishes that the 
rules and regulations implement Chapters 28A.640 and 28A.642 of 
Washington’s Revised Code, and the intent of the chapter is to encom-
pass “similar substantive areas addressed by federal civil rights authori-
ties and in some aspects extend beyond those authorities.”69 
The OSPI regulations are silent on disparate impact discrimination 
even though the language of the EEOL clearly prohibits such discrimina-
                                                 
 62. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.005 (2010). 
 63. Id. 
The legislature finds that one of the recommendations made to the legislature by the achieve-
ment gap oversight and accountability committee created in chapter 468, Laws of 2009, was 
that the office of the superintendent of public instruction should be specifically authorized to 
take affirmative steps to ensure that school districts comply with all civil rights laws, similar to 
what has already been authorized in chapter 28A.640. . .  
Id. 
 64. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.640 (1975). 
 65. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.005 (2010); see also H.B. 3026, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2010). 
 66. Letter from Linda Mangel to Yvonne Ryans, supra note 48. 
 67. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.005 (2010) (emphasis added).  
 68. This section in the Washington Administrative Code was previously entitled “Equal Educa-
tion Opportunity – Sex Discrimination Prohibited” and contained regulations related to the Sex 
Equality Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.640. After the EEOL was enacted, the entire section was 
amended to also prohibit discrimination against protected classes identified in the EEOL. 
 69. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392–190–005 (2010). 
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tion. Further raising questions about the clarity of the OSPI regulations is 
the presence of “effect” language elsewhere in the rule. For example, 
Washington Administrative Code Section 392–190–0591(3) states: “No 
school district shall enter into any contractual or other relationship that 
directly or indirectly has the effect of subjecting any person to discrimi-
nation in connection with employment.”70 
IV. THE OSPI REGULATIONS DO NOT ADEQUATELY PROHIBIT 
DISPARATE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION 
The EEOL was enacted because commissioned studies on Wash-
ington’s achievement gap suggested that more comprehensive state civil 
rights laws would provide more effective avenues for creating and ensur-
ing equality.71 However, the OSPI regulations to enforce the EEOL can-
not effectively carry out the intent of the EEOL because they do not ex-
pressly prohibit disparate impact discrimination. Because the EEOL was 
intended to close the achievement gap, which is in part a result of race-
neutral policies, an explicit prohibition of disparate impact discrimina-
tion is necessary to seriously address these deeply rooted issues. Specifi-
cally, aggrieved persons may face challenges in bringing claims related 
to the achievement gap because many claims could fall into a disparate 
impact discrimination analysis, which has been under attack in the last 
several years in federal litigation. 
A. The EEOL Seeks to Eliminate the Achievement Gap, but the OSPI 
Regulations are Silent on Disparate Impact Discrimination 
This Section addresses concerns with the regulations enacted 
into the Washington Administrative Code (WAC). As provided in 
the EEOL, the Superintendent of Public Instruction developed 
rules and guidelines to eliminate discrimination in public schools 
and ensure that school districts comply with all relevant civil right 
laws. As currently written, however, the rules will not ensure this 
compliance because they fail to clearly prohibit disparate impact 
discrimination. 
Codified in WAC Section 392–190, OSPI’s rules and guidelines are 
silent on disparate impact discrimination, indirect discrimination, or the 
effects of discrimination.72 In its first draft of proposed rules, the State-
                                                 
 70. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392–190–0591(3) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 71. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 72. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392–190–005 (2010) states, in part, as follows: 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish rules and regulations which implement chap-
ters 28A.640 and 28A.642 RCW. The referenced enactments prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sex, race, creed, religion, color, national origin, honorably discharged veteran 
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ment of Purpose specifically provided that “policies and practices which 
have a disparate impact” are prohibited.73 However, by the December 
2010 draft of proposed rules, this language was absent, leaving questions 
about whether school districts can be held liable for disparate impact dis-
crimination. In its comments submitted to the OSPI, the ACLU argued 
that “[t]his omission creates a situation whereby school districts, believ-
ing they are not liable for disparate impact discrimination, may inadvert-
ently be in violation of other applicable state and federal laws.”74 
During the formal comment period, several individuals and organi-
zations opined that the proposed code should clearly state that disparate 
impact discrimination is prohibited to ensure that school districts are in 
compliance with state and federal civil rights laws; otherwise, districts 
may inadvertently violate state and federal laws.75 However, OSPI chose 
to take no action, stating, “[n]othing in these rules is intended to preclude 
the use of a disparate impact analysis to determine if unlawful discrimi-
nation has occurred. The proposed rules do not limit OSPI’s use of a dis-
parate impact analysis when monitoring school district[s] for compliance 
with chapters 28A.640 and 28A.642 RCW.”76 
Moreover, while OSPI did not further explain in the Concise Ex-
planatory Statement why it excluded express language in the Washington 
Code prohibiting disparate impact discrimination, it did remove the word 
“causing” from one section of the proposed regulation—after one public 
comment argued that this language conflicted with existing state and fed-
eral law, eliminated disparate impact claims, and imposed a causational 
standard, which would be too high of a standard to prove and also con-
flicted with the current sex equality rules. OSPI changed the “cause” lan-
guage to “result,” which was also the original language of the sex equali-
ty rule.77 
                                                                                                             
or military status, sexual orientation including gender expression or identity, the presence 
of any sensory, mental or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service 
animal by a person with a disability in Washington public schools. 
 73. Letter from Linda Mangel to Yvonne Ryans, supra note 48. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, CONCISE EXPLANATORY STATEMENT FOR 
RULES PROPOSED AS WSR 11–01–134 (Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter CONCISE EXPLANATORY 
STATEMENT]. 
Comment at page 6: “OSPI should include a provision in the rules expressly prohibiting disparate 
impact discrimination. The proposed rules include a causation requirement, which is too high of a 
burden.” OSPI response: “Change made to WAC 392–190–010. The word ‘causing’ was removed 
from the proposed WAC 392–190–010(5) and the existing language ‘resulting in’ was retained. This 
change was made in order for the adopted rules to mirror the previous sexual equality rules. Nothing 
in these rules is intended to preclude the use of a disparate impact analysis to determine if unlawful 
discrimination has occurred.” 
 76. CONCISE EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 75, at 10. 
 77. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392–190–010(5)(2010): 
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By remaining silent on disparate impact discrimination in the regu-
lations, OSPI fails to “ensure that school districts comply with all civil 
rights laws,” as directed by the EEOL.78 
B. Achievement Gap Claims May Be Appropriately Brought Under the 
Theory of Disparate Impact Discrimination 
The theory of disparate impact discrimination must be available to 
students disadvantaged by the gaps in today’s educational opportunities 
because these disparities are mostly the result of unintentional discrimi-
nation. Proof of discriminatory motive is often unavailable, and in the 
case of the achievement gap, it simply does not exist.79 
Since the enactment of Title VI, courts have often provided a right 
of action for adversely affected groups to attack unintentional discrimi-
natory policies and practices, such as those that contribute to the 
achievement gap. A leading case on the applicability of disparate impact 
theory is Alexander v. Choate. 80 In Alexander, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether Title VI reaches both intentional and disparate impact 
discrimination in the context of Medicaid allotments for inpatient hospi-
tal days.81 As Medicaid recipients, the plaintiffs claimed that a policy 
reducing the number of covered hospital days would have a dispropor-
tionate effect on handicapped persons, who often require longer or more 
frequent care in hospitals.82 Examining the holding of Guardians Ass’n. 
v. Civil Service Commission of New York City,83 the Court held that fed-
eral law does not proscribe only intentional discrimination: “Title VI had 
delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex determination 
of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities constituted sufficient-
ly significant social problems, and were readily enough remediable, to 
warrant altering the practices of the federal grantees that had produced 
                                                                                                             
If a school district concludes that the use of such instruments, materials, or programs re-
sults in a substantially disproportionate number of students who are members of one of 
the groups identified in WAC 392–190–005 to be placed in any particular course of study 
or classification, the school district must take such immediate action as is necessary to as-
sure that such disproportion is not the result of discrimination in the instrument, material, 
or its application. 
 78. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.005 (2010). 
 79. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). “Federal agencies and commentators 
on the plight of the handicapped similarly have found that discrimination against the handicapped is 
primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus.” Id. at 297. While the prac-
tice at issue in this case is not directly related to education or schools, it is analogous to the policies 
and practices known to primarily cause the achievement gap—generally, inequitable access. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 287. 
 83. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
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those impacts.”84 However, Guardians and Alexander suggest there are 
limitations to what disparate impact claims are actionable.85 
The Court classified the discrimination at issue in Alexander as un-
intentional: “Discrimination against the [disabled] was perceived by 
Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but ra-
ther of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect.”86 The Court 
reasoned that federal law proscribed both intentional and unintentional 
discrimination against the disabled because “much of the conduct that 
Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be diffi-
cult if not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe only 
conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.”87 Specifically, one of the cen-
tral aims of the Rehabilitation Act was to eliminate architectural barriers, 
which limited physically disabled individuals access to buildings.88 
While architectural barriers were not erected with the intent of excluding 
disabled individuals, that the barriers existed and caused harm made 
those individuals victims of “[d]iscrimination in access to public trans-
portation.”89 
In Larry P. v. Riles,90 six black schoolchildren named as plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of the use of standardized intelligence 
tests. As a result of a racial disparity in test performance, the standard-
ized tests disproportionately placed black students in special classes for 
the “educable mentally retarded.”91 After the district court enjoined the 
use of these tests because of their racial bias, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the injunction on grounds of Title VI disparate impact 
regulations.92 But the students’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
claims ultimately failed because the “pervasiveness of discriminatory 
effect” could not, without more, “be equated with the discriminatory in-
                                                 
 84. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293. 
 85. Id. at 294. 
 86. Id. at 717. 
 87. Id. at 296–97. 
 88. Id. at 297. These statements would ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify 
the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect as well as by design. 
 89. Id. at 297. 
 90. 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 91. Id. at 973. Black students constituted nine percent of California’s children and twenty-
seven percent of the “educable mentally retarded” (EMR) population. The EMR classes “are con-
ceived of as ‘dead-end’ classes, and a misplacement in EMR causes a stigma and irreparable injury 
to the student.” Id. 
 92. Id. at 972. The court held that there was a discriminatory impact.  
It is undisputed that black children as a whole scored ten points lower than white children on 
the tests, and that the percentage of black children in EMR classes was much higher than for 
whites. As discussed previously, these test scores were used to place black schoolchildren in 
EMR classes and to remove them from the regular educational program. 
Id. 
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tent required.”93 Thus, it is unlikely that achievement gap claims will be 
viable under the Equal Protection Clause because they are generally not 
intentionally discriminatory. 
Some courts have not permitted claims of educational inequality to 
move forward on the theory of disparate impact discrimination by plac-
ing the blame for the disparity on societal factors rather than factors 
within the educational system.94 In African American Legal Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. New York State Department of Education, the New York 
District Court held that Title VI regulations could not provide a remedy 
for the plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims.95 In that case, the plaintiffs—
civil rights organizations and parents of Hispanic and African-American 
public school students—claimed that the attendance-based system of 
funds distribution among school districts had a disparate impact on mi-
norities because absenteeism was higher among inner city minority stu-
dents.96 However, the court found that the practices of the school dis-
tricts—the federal grantees—did not cause the absenteeism.97 Rather, the 
court determined that social problems such as single parenting, poor 
housing, and medical problems contributed to absenteeism among inner 
city students.98 While the court acknowledged that the policy at issue 
appeared racially neutral, it rejected the plaintiffs’ disparate impact ar-
gument, stating that the plaintiffs did not prove that the school’s policy 
was directly linked to the alleged disparate impact on minority students.99 
In denying the application of disparate impact theory to school re-
lated disparities, the court failed to recognize the complex and interrelat-
ed nature of the factors causing the achievement gap. Other courts, how-
ever, have acknowledged that the seemingly neutral policies and practic-
es of schools have the effect of sustaining and fortifying the gaps that 
exist from decades of inequality. For example, Robinson v. Kansas 
stands in contrast to African American Legal Defense Fund. In Robinson, 
students pled a disparate impact claim by arguing that a Kansas statute 
allocating disproportionately large amounts of state funding to low-
enrollment districts resulted in lower funding for minority, foreign, and 
disabled students who attended schools in large, non-affluent school dis-
                                                 
 93. The court cited the discriminatory intent required by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976), stating that the Court has “consistently held that where a neutral classification has a dispro-
portionate effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause only 
if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” Larry P., 793 F.2d at 989. 
 94. See, e.g., African Am. Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Educ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 
330 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 95. Id. at 340. 
 96. Id. at 333. 
 97. Id. at 338. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 339. 
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tricts.100 The district court in Robinson distinguished African American 
Legal Defense Fund stating, “[P]laintiffs in this case allege that the ‘so-
cietal ills’ are caused by the way the State funds the school districts.”101 
The court found that such an allegation sufficed for pleading disparate 
impact.102 
To establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must show that the chal-
lenged practice caused a disproportionately adverse impact.103 Regarding 
the present issue—the achievement gap—Washington’s commissioned 
studies have identified several practices that have adversely resulted in 
lower scores for minorities.104 Thus, future plaintiffs already have the 
groundwork for a claim of disparate impact discrimination. 
C. Without an Express Prohibition of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 
Aggrieved Persons May Not Have Adequate Means to a Right of Action 
If the OSPI regulations are construed as reaching only intentional 
discrimination, aggrieved persons seeking to challenge the achievement 
gap may struggle to find an adequate mechanism for enforcement of the 
EEOL. Students who perceive a disparity as a result of neutral policies or 
procedures will not be able to reposition their complaints under disparate 
treatment claims, because such claims require a showing of discriminato-
ry intent.105 Because the achievement gap is primarily the result of sys-
temic inequalities, a finding of intent to discriminate based on race or 
any of the other protected grounds is unlikely.106 Additionally, aggrieved 
persons will struggle to find adequate enforcement mechanisms under 
federal law because of recent limitations on disparate impact claims. 
Prior to the enactment of the EEOL, aggrieved persons seeking en-
forcement of civil rights laws were required to file a complaint with an 
enforcement agency, such as the Washington HRC or U.S. Department 
of Education Office for Civil Rights, or file a civil suit in order to seek 
relief from the educational practices or procedures that had an actual or 
perceived discriminatory impact.107 The latter remedy, the private right 
of action, is a vital enforcement mechanism that allows individual plain-
                                                 
 100. Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1140 (D. Kan. 2000), aff’d, 295 F.3d 1183 
(10th Cir. 2002). 
 101. Id. at 1141. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989). 
 104. A PLAN TO CLOSE, supra note 1. 
 105. Elston v. Talladega Cnty Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993). “To estab-
lish an [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a challenged action 
was motivated by an intent to discriminate.” Id. 
 106. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 107. See supra Part II.B. 
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tiffs to sue to compel enforcement of the laws and regulations separate 
from how the enforcement agency handles the case.108 This private right 
of action is a crucial tool to disparate impact discrimination litigation 
because these administrative agencies often lack the resources to investi-
gate adequately every case where schools engage in practices that have a 
discriminatory effect.109 
While the EEOL and the OSPI regulations clearly protect the pri-
vate right of action,110 if courts construe these laws so as to not reach 
disparate impact discrimination because of lack of clarity in the text, ag-
grieved persons with disparate impact claims will not have access to the 
courts. This concern is primarily the result of recent limitations to dispar-
ate impact litigation under federal law. Until recently, courts construed 
Title VI and its regulations to prohibit educational institutions (which 
includes school districts because they are recipients of federal funds) 
from engaging in polices and practices that have a disparate impact on 
minority students as well as students that fall into the other protected 
classes.111 
                                                 
 108. The U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, similar to the HRC and OSPI, 
is a federal enforcement agency that responds to complaints of discrimination under federal civil 
rights laws and engages in compliance reviews. 
 109. Sam Spital, Restoring Brown’s Promise of Equality After Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We 
Can’t Wait, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 93, 105 (2003). 
 110. The EEOL provides that there is a private right of action in superior court for both civil 
damages and such equitable relief as the court determines. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.040 (2010). 
While HB 3026 was in the Washington Senate, Senator Honeyford proposed an amendment to the 
bill that would eliminate this section creating a new right of action in superior court. See Proposed 
Amendment to H.B. 3026: Hearing on H.B. 3036 By Comm. on Ways & Means, 2010 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2010). However, the amendment was not adopted. Id. Criminal or civil actions under 
the EEOL and OSPI regulations will be held in abeyance during the pendency of any proceeding in 
state or federal court or before a local, state, or federal agency in which the same claim or claims are 
at issue. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392–190–081(2). This section also states that “[w]here the com-
plainant elects to pursue simultaneous claims in more than one forum, the factual and legal determi-
nations issued by the first tribunal to rule on the claims may, in some circumstances, be binding on 
all or portions of the claims pending before other tribunals.” Id. at (3). 
 111. Dissenting in Sandoval, Justice Stevens noted that “[j]ust about every Court of Appeals 
has either explicitly or implicitly held that a private right of action exists to enforce all of the regula-
tions issued pursuant to Title VI, including the disparate-impact regulations.” Alexander v. Sando-
val, 532 U.S. 275, 293 n.1 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For exemplary decisions, see, for exam-
ple, Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 400 (3d Cir. 1999); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality 
Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936–37 (3d Cir. 1997), summarily vacated and remanded, 524 U.S. 
974 (1998); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 
484 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Latinos Unidos De Chelsea v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 
774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 
1995); Ferguson v. Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 
(2001); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986); Buchanan v. Bolivar, 99 F.3d 
1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981–82 (9th Cir. 1986); Villanueva 
v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996). No Court of Appeals has ever reached a contrary con-
clusion. But cf. N.Y. City Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2000) (sug-
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The major blow to disparate impact litigation under Title VI came 
in Alexander v. Sandoval in 2001.112 Plaintiff Sandoval, representing a 
class action, brought suit in federal court against the Alabama Depart-
ment of Public Safety (the Department)113 to enjoin the Department from 
administering state driver’s license examinations only in English.114 The 
plaintiffs claimed that the English-only test violated federal civil rights 
regulations because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers 
to discrimination based on their national origin.115 In its decision, the Su-
preme Court did not focus on whether the English-only policy had the 
effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin; instead, it focused 
on whether a private right of action to enforce the regulation existed.116 
The Court held in its 5–4 decision that there is no private right of 
action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title 
VI.117 While the Court recognized that agencies may validly prohibit pol-
icies and procedures that have a disparate impact on the protected clas-
ses, it interpreted the statute to prohibit only intentional discrimination.118 
                                                                                                             
gesting that the question of whether a private right of action existed to enforce disparate impact 
regulations may be open). 
 112. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; see also Theresa Glennon, The Stuart Rome Lecture Knocking 
Against the Rocks: Evaluating Institutional Practices and the African American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 10 (2002). Glennon notes that several lower federal court decisions have gone 
even further to eliminate private parties’ access to any judicial relief for violations of the Title VI 
disparate impact regulations. See South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 
F.3d 771, 788 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that Title VI regulations are not enforceable under § 1983); 
Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (also holding that Title VI regula-
tions are not enforceable under § 1983). But see Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 
784 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that Title VI regulations are enforceable under § 1983). 
 113. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278. The Department accepted grants of financial assistance from 
the Department of Justice and Department of Transportation and so subjected itself to the restrictions 
of Title VI. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. In an exercise of the authority granted under Title VI, the Department of Justice prom-
ulgated a regulation forbidding funding recipients to “utilize criteria or methods of administration 
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or 
national origin.” 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2000). The district court enjoined the policy and ordered 
the Department to accommodate the non-English speakers. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 
(M.D. Ala. 1998). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 
F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 116. Sandoval, 523 U.S. at 279. The issue of the private cause of action was the only question 
posed in the petitioner’s, the Department, writ of certiorari. Id. 
Whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action in federal court against a 
State agency that receives federal grant funds, thereby allowing a private individual to en-
force disparate effect regulations promulgated by federal agencies under Section 602 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and bypass the federal agency review and enforcement pro-
cess established by Congress. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (No. 99–1908), 2000 
WL 33979586, at *i. 
 117. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275. 
 118. Id. 
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Therefore, under Title VI, individual plaintiffs can bring suit for alleged 
intentional discrimination. Moreover, the Court found no evidence that 
Congress intended to provide a private right of action to enforce dispar-
ate impact regulations.119 However, agencies may validly prohibit activi-
ties that have a disparate impact on the basis of the protected classes.120 
Dissenting, Justice Stevens argued that the Court repeatedly and 
consistently affirmed the right of individuals to bring civil suits to en-
force rights guaranteed by Title VI, assuming that Congress intended a 
private right of action whenever such a right of action was necessary to 
protect individual rights granted by valid federal law.121 Moreover, Jus-
tice Stevens noted that the plaintiffs, although denied an implied private 
right of action under Title VI, may still be able to enforce the Title VI 
regulations against state actors under § 1983.122 Justice Stevens stated, 
“This legal distinction between reliance on an ‘implied’ right and explic-
itly accessing the regulation through § 1983 gave a glimmer of hope that 
disparate impact private actions might still be viable despite the Sandoval 
ruling.”123 But merely a glimmer of hope remains as courts have since 
split on whether Sandoval also precludes disparate impact suits even if 
brought under § 1983.124 
                                                 
 119. Id. at 281–82. Specifically, the Court argued that § 602 of Title VI simply grants regulato-
ry agencies the power to effectuate the individual rights created in § 601. Id. Because this language 
focuses on granting power to agencies rather than protecting individuals, the majority could not find 
any textual support for the proposition that Congress intended to create a private cause of action to 
enforce § 602 regulations. Id. at 288–89. 
 120. Id. at 283. 
 121. Id. at 294. 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). “Every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 
rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law. . . .” Id. 
 123. Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child 
Left Behind Act’s Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 267 (2004). 
 124. Id. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming 
dismissal of complaint alleging that Department of Transportation policy violated disparate impact 
regulation issued under Title VI because “Title VI does not create the right the plaintiffs seek to 
enforce . . .”); Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 
2001) (holding that because Title VI proscribed only intentional discrimination, plaintiffs alleging 
that New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection policies had a disparate impact on them 
did “not have a right enforceable through a 1983 action”), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 939 (2002); Ceaser 
v. Pataki, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5098, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing housing discrimination 
complaint because Title VI disparate impact regulation at issue did not create federal rights for the 
purposes of § 1983 as it was “too far removed from what Congress proscribed in section 601”); 
Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., 236 F. Supp. 2d 314, 338–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting summary judgment 
on a claim alleging that the use of certain teacher qualifying exams had a disparate impact on mi-
nority educators because regulations issued under Title VI do not create federal enforceable rights 
for the purposes of § 1983); Bonnie ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 
2001) (“To hold [that disparate impact]. . . regulations are enforceable under § 1983 would be equiv-
alent to holding that while Congress did not intend § 602 regulations to be enforceable against pri-
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Before Sandoval, the Court interpreted Title VI to proscribe dispar-
ate impact discrimination. In holding that plaintiffs cannot enforce Title 
VI through a private right of action, the Sandoval Court overturned thirty 
years of precedent.125 One such overturned case was Lau v. Nichols.126 In 
that case, the Court found that a San Francisco school system’s failure to 
either provide English language instruction or alternative adequate in-
struction to approximately 1,800 students of Chinese ancestry who did 
not speak English had the effect of foreclosing these students from any 
meaningful education and thus violated § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.127 Through the private right of action, the class of disadvantaged 
students was able to find relief. Post Sandoval, relief through private ac-
tion would no longer be available for similarly situated plaintiffs. 
Given the limiting nature of Sandoval on disparate impact claims in 
federal courts, aggrieved persons’ legal avenues for challenging discrim-
inatory policies and procedures in their schools would be in jeopardy if 
the OSPI regulations do not explicitly reach these claims. The only other 
enforcement mechanism available to aggrieved persons would be 
through either the OSPI or the Department of Education Office for Civil 
Rights, which may lack the resources to investigate and bring suit for 
every legitimate claim.128 
V. THE OSPI REGULATIONS SHOULD EXPLICITLY PROHIBIT DISPARATE 
IMPACT DISCRIMINATION 
The OSPI regulations should be amended because they fail to clear-
ly prohibit disparate impact discrimination. Specifically, Washington 
Administrative Code Section 392–190–005 should be amended to in-
clude language such as the following: “Policies and practices that cause 
or result in discrimination against persons on the basis of the classes de-
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fined in this chapter are prohibited.” Including this language is crucial to 
“ensure that school districts comply with all relevant civil rights laws” as 
they are statutorily required, including those that prohibit disparate im-
pact discrimination.129 First, a clear prohibition of disparate impact dis-
crimination puts educational institutions on notice that even when there 
was no intent to discriminate against students that belong to a protected 
class, policies and procedures may still have an unfair, disparate impact 
on those students. 
Second, a clear prohibition on disparate impact discrimination helps 
OSPI carry out the clear intent of the EEOL to address the “deleterious 
effect of discrimination” in Washington public schools.130 Given that the 
EEOL was enacted to remedy the achievement gap in schools, it is essen-
tial that the OSPI regulations allow for enforcement against the root 
cause of these gaps—neutral policies that have a disproportionate effect 
on minority students. 
Third, clearly acknowledging that the OSPI regulations reach dis-
parate impact claims ensures that aggrieved persons will have a private 
right of action in Washington courts to enforce the EEOL and OSPI 
regulations. A lack of clarity in the reach of the OSPI regulations could 
jeopardize aggrieved persons’ ability to obtain relief, especially since 
Sandoval has drastically limited these claims in federal litigation.131 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The primary challenge facing American public education—and ed-
ucation in Washington State—is the achievement gaps among students of 
different races.132 According to the National Education Association, 
“[a]chievement gaps exist when students with relatively equal ability do 
not achieve in school at the same levels,” and one group far exceeds the 
other in academic success.133 
The causes of the achievement gaps are several and interrelated. 
Researchers have identified societal causes such as discrimination, pov-
erty, home and community learning opportunities, access to health care, 
and issues of housing and mobility.134 But the primary causes of the dis-
parities in school performance are rooted in the policies and procedures 
of the school systems themselves, such as inequitable distribution of 
skilled, experienced teachers and insufficient and inequitable school 
                                                 
 129. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.642.005 (2010). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275. 
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funding.135 These policies and practices are neutral—
nondiscriminatory—on their face but have a disproportionately deleteri-
ous impact on students and communities of color.136 
The problems that contribute to the achievement gap will not be re-
solved overnight. But the enactment of the EEOL was an important step 
for Washington, signaling that legislators recognize that systemic, even if 
unintentional, discrimination is at least a contributing factor to the dis-
parities children of color face in school. In order for OSPI to carry out 
the intent of the EEOL, the OSPI regulations must clearly prohibit poli-
cies and procedures that have a disparate impact. 
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